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Editorial
Zimbabwe’s Independence in April 1980, achieved as it was by a 
remarkable combination of revolutionary and legal activity, created a 
special challenge to Zimbabwean lawyers. Particularly significant for legal 
scholars at the University of Zimbabwe was the dramatic transformation 
resulting from the fact that a whole body of ideas and perspectives, 
unacceptable, unpopular or actually unlawful under the colonial state, 
suddenly became ‘thinkable’ and available to thinking Zimbabweans. Of 
these ideas, Marxism and Marxism-Leninism were only the most dramatic 
example, though by virtue of the election to government of a Party which 
proclaimed as its ultimate objective the achievement of a socialist order 
through Marxism-Leninism, they became especially relevant.
This new order was characterised then, as it remains today, five years 
later, by the basic elements of intellectual stimulation — contradiction, 
compromise, urgent demands for change and powerful claims for the 
retention of the status quo. Nowhere is this more evident than in the law, 
both within and around Zimbabwe, wherein is expressed in varying degrees 
of clarity, the tensions and tentative solutions generated by the material, 
social, economic and political realities of this ferment.
Thus Zimbabwean legal scholars face an agenda demanding, at a 
minimum, the study and awareness of the legal dimensions of, on the one 
hand — the articulated democratic demands of a liberated majority for 
justice, health, education, housing, employment and an end to poverty 
and dependence; and on the other hand — the equally articulate (if less 
rhetorical) claims of a powerful minority (as the first priority) for the 
retention or the minimum transformation of the capitalist economy. The 
legal dynamics of this contradiction must be analysed and understood in 
the light shed by scholars using a wide variety of perspectives.
The task also demands a thorough knowledge of the substantive 
elements that make up Zimbabwe’s legal system. This must include a full 
awareness of the British-designed Lancaster House Constitution, replete 
with historic compromises, as well as of the inherited state machine, deeply 
. imbued through both statute law and judicial practice, with authoritarian 
values and techniques. It demands the urgent study and exposition of the 
dense body of Zimbabwean Customary Law. Nor can it avoid a basic 
knowledge of Roman-Dutch Law and its deeper Romanist foundations. 
These provide a potential pathway to the conceptual treasury of one of 
the oldest legal system and to a richness of Romanist ideas developed 
throughout the modern world in both socialist and capitalist states which 
share with us this tradition. The paucity of serious scholastic exploration 
of Roman Law during the colonial period may be explained by the 
overriding imperial cpnnection with the Anglo-Saxon Legal system. Such 
scholarship provides an avenue to a storehouse of knowledge and ideas, 
which Zimbabwean legal scholars may tread. A serious gap in our 
scholarship, perhaps understandable in the context of the final chauvinistic 
days of “ Rhodesia” , namely an awareness of the comparative experience
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and legal knowledge of post-colonial Africa, needs to be remedied so that 
insights from this source can be added to the others that we must use in 
our efforts to make sense, for ourselves and others, of Zimbabwean legal 
developments at this challenging stage.
The Zimbabwe Law Review is intended as an indispensible means of 
meeting the above challenges. Early in 1983 the Board of the Law 
Department decided to work towards its publication. It also saw the Review 
as an important part of the work to evolve a contemporary and more 
relevant curriculum for Zimbabwean legal education. Thus readers will 
notice the particular emphasis given in this first issue to matters relating 
to Family Law, including a contribution on the subject from Tanzania, 
which the editors saw as requiring particular attention, The Department 
is also conscious of the important role the Review should play in an 
ongoing legal debate involving the Bench, the Profession, the Goverment 
and academics. This was one of the roles of the Zimbabwe Law Journal 
founded in 1961 as the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Law Journal by Professor 
R H Christie. The Journal ceased publication at the end of 1982.
As presently conceived the Zimbabwe Law Review will provide a 
vehicle not only for academics but also for students whose work merits 
publication. As the present volume shows, the pages of the Review are 
also open to non-Zimbabwean contributors, especially those writing on 
matters relevant to Africa and the Third World. This volume also 
demonstrates the editors’ readiness to receive contributions from authors 
in Government and the profession, and we are particularly pleased to be 
able to publish here an article by the present Minister of Home Affairs. 
The Review will seek to encourage active debate on contemporary issues 
and thus the section entitled Dialogue seeks contributions on more 
immediate and controversial subjects in a style of presentation less rigorous 
than that required of other articles. It is hoped that the review of legal 
developments and the publication of relevant documentation will be a 
regular feature.
Thus the Review is seen as being launched in a new context, offering 
new opportunities and challenges to Zimbabwean and other legal writers, 
th e  objective is to respond with scholarship of the highest quality, 
regardless of its viewpoint. The Editors are conscious that by taking full 
advantage of this new intellectual freedom and opening the Review in this 
way to scholars from all ideologies they are making a fundamental break 
with the past. This however is not only consistent with the newly acquired 
academic freedom of the University of Zimbabwe, but also with the 
progressive order which is the national objective. Nor, it seems, will this 
new policy be inconsistent with the motto emblazoned on the facade of 
the Law Department: LEX EST ARS BONI ET AEQUI (THE LAW IS 
THE ART OF THE GOOD AND THE JUST)
Lastly we express the Department’s gratitude to the Ford Foundation for 
it!s assistance in the launching of the Review
Editor in Chief
Harare. 18th ADril. 1985.
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CRIMINAL LAW POLICY IN RELATION TO THE 
DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION
G. F e l t o e *
1. INTRODUCTION r
All legal systems have had to address the difficult problem of deciding 
how to deal with the defence of provocation in the context of criminal 
cases.1 This defence is very frequently pleaded in relation to crimes of 
violence where either death or physical injury has been caused.2 It has 
been said that: ;;v-
“ . . . the criminal law must strike a proper balance between 
the, protection of society from harmful conduct and ensuring 
justice and fairness to the individual accused” .3
This applies equally in relation to the defence of provocation. The question 
is how properly this balance is io be achieved arid what ought to be the 
policy of our criminal law in regard to this defence. In broad terms it can 
be observed that, on the one hand, the law has an obligation to. take steps 
to discourage persons from losing their tempers when provoked and 
resorting to acts of violence’which may cause death or injury. On the other 
hand, it would be unjust and unfair to an accused if no heed at all were 
to be paid to the fact that his behaviour may have been influenced by the 
provocation to which he was subjected.
Thus far, so good. What now js highly problematical is to decide to 
what extent the provocation should he taken into account, bearing in mind 
that the courts are concerned both with individual justice and protection 
of the society. This issue bears upon both verdict and sentence. What 
makes this matter so difficult is that different people react in widely 
divergent ways to provocative words or conduct.4 Some people are able 
to maintain self-control despite being on the receiving end of the most 
severe provocation, whereas others lose their self-control completely in 
the face of the most slight provocation. And, between the polarities, there 
is an alniost infinite range of varyinjg responses dependent upon individual 
personality make-up. Loss of self-coritrol, is, in fact, a function of two 
main variables, namely, the degree of provocation, and individual 
temperament. This can ^ e illustrated by two rough diagrams.
B.A. (Rhodes), LL.B (London) M. Phil (Kent) Senior Lecturer in Law, University of 
Zimbabwe, Department of Law
As we; will see later, very often other factors are found in combination with provocation in 
such cases. The most common of these is vpluntary intoxication. In this introduction, the focus 
will be upon provocation alone and the complications which creep in when provocation is 
combined with, say intoxication will be examined later.
2 An indicatiqn of the high incidence of provocation in such cases is given by the observation
by Glanville Williams in his Textbook o f  Criminal Law  at p. A ll  that in England,“ Half the 
intentional killings of adult males are in rage or a quarrel” .
See Burchell and Hunt, South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 1. p. 301
OVERWHELMINGLY SEVERE MODERATE SLIGHT 
HIGH
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Variable1 Degree o f  provocation
Variable 2 Susceptibility to provocation4
Will not lose self-control, even - Will lose self-control even
when degree of provocation high where degree of provocation slight
HIGHLY RESISTANT , f HIGHLY UNRESISTANT
The task thus faced by the criminal law is to design rules on the 
provocation defence which will both deal fairly with accused in diverse 
situation, involving differing intensities of provocation and variable 
responses thereto, and will also adequately accommodate the need to 
afford proper protection to the public.
The main purposes of this article will be to examine the nature of 
the formulas worked out in Zimbabwe to. deal with this defence and to 
comment upon whether these formulas: constitute a satisfactory 
compromise between the competing interests of fairness to the accused 
and public protection. Part; 1 seeks to explain how the law presently 
operates and Part 2 addresses the issue of whether the law is satisfactory.
Part I
2. THE ZIMBABWE LAW
The two-stage approach to the defence of provocation in relation to 
a murder charge enunciated in the Federal Supreme Court in the case of 
R v Tenganyika5, and followed in our law in a series of High Court 
cases, starting with R v Majay& has now received the stamp bf approval 
of our Supreme Court in the recent case of R  v NatiganF- The then1 Chief
In a challenging article entitled “ The Physiology of Provocation”  contained in 1970 C L R  
634, Brett observes - ,
“ The degree of response to a stress situation varies considerably from one individual to 
another: Some men are highly vulnerable to stress, others strikingly resistant to it . . .
It seems likely . . . that a number of factors, some genetic, others environmental, 
combine to produce the differences of susceptibility and response” .
The extremes of reaction have been variously characterised in the judgments and text books. 
For example, the highly resistant individual is described by the use of such words as extremely 
even or good-tempered, stoical, tolerant, phlegmatic, whereas the highly unresistant individual 
is depicted as extremely quick-tempered, volatile, pugnacious, hot-headed, sensitive and so on. 
1958 R & N 228 (F C-S) . “
1965 R L R 106 
1982 (3) SA 800 (ZS)
5 .
6. 
7 .
Justice Fieldsend,. did, however, suggest a possible modification to the 
test to be used under the second rung of the Tenganyika case.8
2.1 Homicide cases
(a) The tenganyika approach
. . The two-stage test for the defence of provocation in relation to.a 
murder case set out in the Tenganyika case can be summarised as follows:
Stage /  (the subjective stage)
At this stage the sole issue is whether the accused had subjective 
intention Jo kill.9 If he did not, he cannot be convicted of murder as the 
requisite mens rea for this crime would be absent. He could, however,, 
be convicted of culpable homicide.10
Stage 2 (the objective stage) - -
Even if the accused did have the intention to kill his victim, he may 
still have a partial defence. If the accused did intentionally kill, but he 
had completely lost his self-control at the time as a result of the provocation 
to which he had been subjected, then the question must be asked whether 
the provocation was of such a magnitude that it would have caused the 
reasonable man to lose his self-control. If, on an application of the 
objective standard, the court decides that the provocation was sufficient 
to have caused the reasonable man to act in the same manner as the 
accused,: the accused will be found guilty of the lesser crime of culpable 
homicide. In other words, the key question at this stage is whether, like 
the accused, the. reasonable man would have been unable to have stopped 
himself from intentionally killing in the circumstances.
(b) Commentary on the two stages in the Tenganyika case
(i) The subjective issue
The. first stage focusses upon the central, factual issue in any murder 
case, namely, whether the accused possessed the requisite subjective 
intention to kill his victim. It is now emphatically established in our law 
that the. test for intention is entirely subjective11- This applies both in 
respect of actual and legal intention. Thus, in respect of legal intention,
142 ' Feltoe, Criminal policy and defence o f  provocation
8.
9.
1959 (3) SA 392 (A)
It can be argued that here provocation is not really operating as a defence as such. The 
accused will simply be denying that he had mens rea for the crime. He will be 
claiming that the provocation (perhaps combined with other things such as intoxication) 
caused him to act without the requisite intention. See J.E. Stannard “ The Demise of 
Drunkenness”  1982 Legal Studies 29i.
The question here is whether he is.automatically found guilty bf culpable homicide < 
whether the court will only find him guilty of this crime if it finds that the requisite^  ----------  —j requisite
mens rea is present. This issue will be dealt with later o n  in this article
Thus m.Jt u Majahe 1965 R L R 106 at 108, the judge stated “ If the court believes the 
accused when he says [he did not intend to kill] that ends the inquiry as the tdst is a ' 
subjecttve one; and no matter, how unreasonable it might seem that he should not have
then caedit quaestio."had the intent to kill, if the court believes him,
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the question is not whether the reasonable man would have foreseen that 
there was possibility of deatrrbtJing caused as cTTesult of a particular 
activity, but instead, whether the accused foresaw a risk of death but 
nonetheless continued to act recklessly without paying due regard to 
Whether or not that risk eventuated. Put in the context of provocation 
the issue is not, at this stage, whether the accused’s reaction to the pro­
vocation was reasonable or whether the reaction was in reasonable pro^ 
portion to the degree of provocation. The only issue is whether the State 
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused in fact intended to kill.
At the first stage, therefore, provocation must be considered together 
with all the other salient features of the case which may have a bearing 
upon whether the accused in fact intended to kill. The extent of provoca­
tion and its effect on the accused’s state of mind may be only one of many 
subjective factors to be considered at this stage. For instance, personality 
characteristics may be relevant to the matter of intention to kill. Thus, 
for example, if the accused is a very quick-tempered or hot-headed in­
dividual who tends to act impulsively, without considering the conse­
quences of his action, his responsive action in the face of provocation may 
not have been accompanied by the subjective intention required for the 
crime. So, too, if he is particularly sensitive about some physical feature 
or disability (such as a badly scarred face) and, when he caused death, 
he was angrily reacting to some taunt about this disability, the court will 
obviously have to take into account these circumstances when considering 
whether that particular accused formed the intention to kill. Finally, factors 
such as intoxication will also have to be taken into account. Very frequently 
provocation goes hand-in-hand with intoxication. Passions may be more 
readily inflamed as a result of the influence of alcohol or drugs. The 
combined effects of the impairment of perceptions brought about by 
alcohol consumption and loss of temper due to provocation may be such 
that the court is unable to find that .the accused possessed the requisite 
subjective intention. On the other hand, the mere fact that there were a 
number of subjective features in addition to provocation which may have 
influenced the accused’s behaviour does not necessarily mean that the 
accused lacked the intention for the crime. Thus, even though, when the 
accused responded to the provocation he was somewhat drunk, he; may 
nonetheless have formed the intention to kill. Or, if the provoked person 
was somewhat mentally subnormal or psychopathic, he may still have been 
able to form the requisite intention,12
In the context, the expression “ blind rage” is often used to describe the 
situation where the accused lacked any intention whatsoever to commit 
the crime because he had entirely lost his self-control and had acted without 
knowing at all what he was doing. However, it should be noted that the 
first rung of Tenganyika is not restricted to situations where loss of 
self-control was so complete that the accused had absolutely no awareness 
of what he was doing. It also encompasses cases where the accused had
12' A good example of this is the South African case of S  v Grove-Mitchell 1975 (3) SA 417 (A) 
where despite the fact that the accused had an immature personality, was somewhat provoked 
and his mind was befuddled by liquor, the court found that he had the intention to kill...
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some partial awareness of what he was doing, but the accused did not 
appreciate that the particular consequence, namely death, would 
eventuate.13
The issue of whether the requisite subjective mens rea is present is 
frequently by no means easy to decide. Where the accused,categorically 
denies that he intended to kill, the problem arises of deciding on an 
inferential basis whether it can be found that he had actual or legal 
mention despite his denial. This problem is most acute where the State 
concedes that there was no actual intention to kill, but Seeks to persuade 
the court that on the facts the only reasonable inference is that there was 
legal intention to kill. In cases where there was some degree of provocation, 
the courts have constantly to bear in. mind that each individual has his 
own unique personality make-up and that different people respond in 
widely differing ways to various types of provocative behaviour.. The 
presence of further factors, such as intoxication, makes the exploration 
into the accused’s state of mind even more complicated. Finally the entire 
incident may have occurred over a very short space of time and the courts 
are faced with the problem of trying to decide what was going on in the 
accused’s mind over this brief period.
Reference to a few of the nomicide cases involving provocation will serve 
to illustrate some of these complexities.
In the Tenganyika case, the trial court’s finding of intention to kill 
was held by the Appeal Court to have been incorrect. In coming to this 
conclusion, it took into account the accused’s advanced state of. 
intoxication, the provocation to which he had been subjected, namely, 
the infliction of a painful and crippling injury in the dark by the deceased, 
and the wild and random manner of the knife wounds rendered by the 
accused. The Appeal Court also observed that the trial court had,erred 
in attaching too much weight to the accused’s recollection of events of 
the evening. Although he. seemed to have had some general idea of what 
had happened, looked at carefully this knowledge did not go very far in 
establishing his mental state at the time of the crime.
A few cases where the accused were found not guilty of murder 
because it was found that there was no intention to kill may usefully be 
cited. Perhaps the most far-reaching case in this regard is that of S v 
Turk14. Here the court found that, although the accused was fully aware 
of what he was doing when he fetched the jack handle to use to assault 
the victim, and although he fully appreciated that he was beating the 
deceased over the head with this heavy metal object, there was reasonable 
doubt, given the extent of the provocation and the accused’s very strong 
reaction thereto, as to whether he in fact appreciated that the assault would
144 Felloe, Criminal policy and defence o f  provocation
l3' See S  v Turk 1979 (4) SA 621 (Z). On the other hand, in terms of our law it may be found 
that, although there was some loss of self-control, the accused still had enough awareness of 
what he was doing to possess subjective intention.
1979 (4) SA 621 (Z)14.
Z. L. Rev: Vol. 1 & 2 1983-84 145
result in death and, nonetheless, recklessly persisted therein. Here the court 
stated that whilst loss of self-control “ might not prevent an accused 
knowing what he is doing, it might negative the inference that he 
appreciated the fu ll consequences of his act.” In the case of Zibengwa 
v S15 the provocation was very strong indeed, consisting as it did, of a 
liberation fighter finding on his return from the war that his wife was 
pregnant by another man and later, discovering her in bed with another 
man, and wife then in the ensuring quarrel, grabbing his private parts and 
applying considerable pressure to them, as well as biting him. So too, 
intentipn was not found.to have been present in S v Nyakatambwa,16 
where there had been a history of nagging by a husband of his wife and 
where, after the husband had arrived home drunk, he had poked his wife 
with a hoe, she had promptly seized the hoe and had struck him twice 
over the head with it. Finally, in Chawana v. S17, intention was found 
to have been absent where, after an altercation between a man and a 
woman, the woman had seized his private parts and the man had picked 
up a metal object and had inflicted a fatal stab wound upon her.
On the other hand, the accused in the following cases were found 
guilty of murder even though, in each, there was some degree of 
provocation.
In R v Bureke18 despite the fact that the accused was angry at the 
time of the killing because he suspected (wrongly) that his wife was having 
a sexual liaison with another man, and despite the fact that the wounds 
were inflicted in a wild and random manner, the court still found him 
guilty of murder as the accused had admitted that he had not lost his 
self-control and had intended to kill his wife. Similarly, in S v Howard19 
the court found that, even though the accused had acted in an extravagant 
manner, he had formed the intention to'kilirTKecouft here stressed that 
in deciding upon whether there- was 'aiT'intention to kill, all the 
circumstances had to be taken into account and in the present case:- 
“ . . . the most careful consideration [had] to be given to the 
effect upon the accused of the combination of the factors of 
the beer he had consumed and the provocation to which the 
deceased had undoubtedly subjected him” .
Dealing with the matter of intoxication, the court concluded that the 
consumption of liquor had not clouded the accused’s judgement, but had 
“ perhaps tended to render [him] a little lesslong-suffering than he might 
otherwise have been” . On the question of provocation, although the 
accused had become completely enraged and had acted in an extreme 
fashion when he brutally attacked the deceased with a knife the court 
should be careful “ noflo'infer too readily from the very extravance of 
the accused’s behaviour” that he had so completely lost his self-control
15‘ A-154-80
16' HC-H 76-82.
11 ■ SC 89-83
18- 1960 (I) SA 49 (F S Q
19- 1972 R L R 254 (G D)
that he had lacked the capacity to form an intention to kill. Such extreme 
behaviour, it said, may simply “ be the result of the accused having yielded, 
to a passion which aroused in him an actual desire to bring about the death 
of his victim” .
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So, too, in the case of Chidziwa v S20intention to kill was found to have 
been present even though there was some verbal provocation and the 
accused was somewhat.drunk. The same features were present in Misheck 
v S21 and, again, the court found that nonetheless the accused had had 
intention to kill.
As the test is subjective at this stage, what is the significance of factors 
such as that there was a cooling-off period subsequent to the provocation 
or that the harm inflicted was disproportionate or excessive, given the 
amount of provocation to which the accused was subjected? Some of the 
Zimbabwean cases appear to lay down as a rule o f law that the existence 
of some cooling-off period renders inoperative the defence of provocation 
even under the first rung of Tenganyika.22 *However, these dicta should 
not, it is respectfully suggested, be. taken to establish an absolute rule that 
loss of self-control can never extend over a period of time, and that if 
objectively the responsive action was not on the sudden, immediately after 
the provocation, then the defence of provocation cannot avail, even at 
the first stage of Tenganyika.23 Granted that in most cases a time lapse, 
particularly a lengthy one, between the provocation and the responsive 
conduct will mean that the accused must have rec Dvered control over his 
mental faculties by the time he acted, and that th§ harm he inflicted was 
therefore intentionally done in retaliation or revenge. But this does not 
mean that there might not be exceptional cases where the court finds that 
the-loss of self-control extended over a period of time on a continuous 
basis, and that when the accused finally acted, the accused was still
20: A-225-77 ' ,
21; A-135 78
22’ Thus, in Tsiga v S A-77-76, Lewis J A said “ It is o f  the essence of a defence of provocation 
that has the effect of reducing the crime from assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm 
to common assault or murder to culpable homicide, that the reaction to-the provocation must 
be sudden, in the sense that the person provoke'd acts on the spur of the moment and in 
circumstances where he has temporarily lost his power, of self-control and does not appreciate 
what he is doing” . In A G v Tobiwa and Ors A-78-80, Baron J A stated that . . the law 
simply does not allow retaliation of the kind resorted, to. by the respondents. Provocation - 
and severe provocation - there clearly was; but for provocation to be pleaded in mitigation of 
sentence it.must, in fact, give rise to loss of self-control; anger or resentment, however 
. understandable, is not sufficient. This why the spontaneity o f  the reaction is vital fo r  the 
defence to succeed”. Finally, in Mapfumo v S  SC 80-83, George C J, in dealing with the 
matter of sentence in a murder case, attached significance to the fact that some time had 
passed from the moment when the accused became aware of the infidelity and the actual 
moment of the attack and that his action followed brooding over the wrong suffered and was 
not an instantaneous reaction to the provocation.
23, Referring to the position in English law, Smith and Hogan, in the 4th edition of their book 
Criminal Law at p. 297, deal with the requirement of subjective loss of self-control. In this 
connection they say “ Cooling time is obviously a fact of .great importance in deciding this 
particular question; but it should always be remembered that it is not a matter of law, but one 
item of evidence in answering the question: was D deprived of his-self-control when he did the 
fatal act?” Brett in 1970 C L R  at 638-9 suggests that these are situations where the lapse of 
time may cause the accused’s temper to get hotter and not cooler.
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suffering from loss of self-control to such an extent that he lacked the 
intention to kill. This would appear to be the basis of the decision in the 
Turk case referred to earlier, the court finding that even though the incident 
occurred over a period of time, the accused never regained his self-control. 
Indeed, from a psychological standpoint, it may be that the rage could 
intensify over time, leading finally to a complete loss of self- control.24 
It should be remembered that the subjective test is not concerned with 
how a reasonable person would have acted in those circumstances, but 
with the effect of the provocation upon the particular accused which 
necessitates reference to the subjective personality characteristics of that 
accused.
The fact that the accused acted in a fashion which was excessive in 
the light of the provocation he received should not be seen as being 
necessarily fatal to the defence of provocation at the subjective stage. 
Again, the essential aspect at this stage is whether the accused possessed 
the requisite subjective intention. There is thus no rule of law that there 
must be some reasonable proportion or relationship between the degree 
of provocation offered and the extent of harm inflicted. A complete 
overreaction to provocation may indeed be indicative of complete loss of 
self-control and of absence of intention.25
In both these situations, it would thus be possible for the court to 
reach the conclusion that although the accused acted in highly unreasonable 
fashion in the circumstance, he lacked the requisite intent and therefore 
he cannot be convicted of murder.
j  .
The next question which arises in relation to the first rung of he 
Tenganyika case is what happens if the court finds that the accused lacked 
the intention to kill? If the court makes this finding then it clears that 
the accused cannot be convicted of murder. He could, still be 
convicted of culpable homicide. The issue here is whether he is 
automatically found guilty of lesser charge of culpable homicide because 
of the operation of the specific intent doctrine or whether he can only 
be found guilty of the lesser charge if the requirements for that crime have 
been satisfied. It would seem that the former applies in our law and that 
the accused would be found guilty automatically of the lesser charge as 
the specific intent doctrine would appear to apply in our law to both cases 
involving voluntary intoxication and to cases where provocation is present. 
This does not seem to have been laid down expressly in any of our cases 
on provocation but it has been impliedly established in the cases where 
on an application of the first rung of Tenganyika the Court found that 
there was no intention to kill and then went on to find the accused guilty 
of culpable homicide without any explicit enquiry into whether the /e-
■ ■ f
24' On the other hand, the fact that the accused acted in an extreme fashion after the provocation 
is not decisive on the matter of self-control. See cases such as Bureke and Howard referred to 
above.
25- Brett op, cit. at p 638 argues that in the light of the scientific evidence on the effects of 
provocation it is folly to demand . . a reasonable proportion between the provocative act 
and reaction.”  Subjectively the actor may be the sort of person who is unable to prevent 
himself from acting in an excessive way once he has lost his self-control.
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quirements of culpable homicide were present.26 That the specific intern 
doctrine is applied is further confirmed because it has been clearly establish 
ed in our law that whereas provocation can reduce assault with intent t  
do grievous bodily harm to common assault, provocation does not operai 
as a defence to a charge of common assault.21
If, as it seems, the specific intent doctrine is still operative 
Zimbabwe in respect of the defence of provocation, it may be that c 
law is different in this regard from the South African Law. (It is argi 
by the authors in the second edition of Burchell and Hunt, South Afrit 
Law and Procedure, VolT'pp 308-309 that in the light of the subject 
approach to the defence of provocation in South Africa specific int 
doctrine is or should be inapplicable.)
A further difficulty arises where, in combination with provocat 
there was a significant degree of voluntary intoxication. Whatnapj , 
if the accused would not have succumbed to the provocation if he 
been sober as where, for instance, in his drunken state he takes off 
at an inoffensive remark or overreacts to a trivial insult? Here it w ' 
seem clear that the specific intent doctrine would have to be applied bee 
of the presence Of the factor of voluntary intoxication, just as it per' 
where there is a mixture of voluntary intoxication and other defen'
(ii) The objective issue
Whereas at stage one of the Tenganyika approach the coi 
considering the matter of subjective intention and therefore has to 
at provocation together with all the other relevant subjective features1 
may be present, at the objective stage which is reached after it has 
found that intention to kill was present, the exclusive focus is4ipc 
matter of provocation. The vital question is whether despite the fac 
the accused intentionally ended the life of his victim he is nonet 
entitled to a partial defence in the light of provocation. If the cour 
that because of the provocation the accused subjectively lost his self-c 
before intentionally killing his victim, under the second rung of Teng 
the sole remaining issue is whether the reasonable person placed 
same situation as the accused would have responded to that dej 
provocation in same-manner as the accused. When this final ob 
question is being addressed no heed is paid to factors personal 
accused such as his personality idiosyncrasies, or the fact that 
drunk.
■ —  -  -  - — .— -  -  4 --------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------
26‘ See, for instance, the cases of Tenganyika, itself and Turk, referred to above. In bot! 
cases it, would, however, have been easy toJI&ve found that the requirements of culp 
homicide had been satisfied.Jflfrenganyifnrthe accused acted under the influence of 
considerable intoxication tula in Turk the-accused jumped unreasonably to the conch 
which caused him to lose Ms temper. (See the appeal judgment in this case A-159-79.. 
sorts of cases it is most unlikely that the mens rea for culpable homicide will be abse 
Burchell and Hunt, South African Criminal Law Procedure) Vol 1 (2nd ed.) at p. 30'
27■ See Tsigav S  A-77-76, S  V Gomene G-S-l 15-79 and Zengeya v S  1982 R L R 29 (R
28, See S  v Jassane 1973 (4) 5rA 658 (T). In this case the voluntary intoxication led on t. 
mistake of fact. Because of the existence of voluntary intoxication, only a partial def 
allowed and the accused was found guilty of common assault instead of thie crime wi. 
he had been charged, namely, assault with intent to murder.
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The essence. of the second rung of Tenganyika is that in certain 
circumstances of provocation, it is proper to convict the accused of 
culpable homicide rather than murder even though he intentionally killed. 
(This can be characterised as the crime reduction approach). By contrast 
in South Africa the position is adopted that an intentional killing in these 
circumstance is by definition murder as provocation does not constitute 
a legitimate excuse and the provocation received can only affect sentence. 
(This may be described as the sentence reduction approach). In Nangani 
the Supreme Court, whilst condeding that there were arguments in favour 
of both these approaches, came down on the side of the crime reduction 
approach. In reading thjs conclusion the Appeal Court argues as follows: 
It accepted in principle that a provoked intentional killing accorded with 
the strict definition of murder, as an intentional killing without legitimate 
excuse. However, it maintained that if provocation could constitute an 
extenuating circumstance, then there could be ‘‘no question o f  principle 
involved” in reducing murder to culpable homicide where there was 
provocation on the same sort of basis as self-defence and compulsion can 
totally or partially excuse intentional killings.29 30.Further it said certain 
practical consideration outweighed the desirability of adhering to strict 
legal theory in this field. Although the crime reduction approach “ . . . 
might be seen as giving insufficient weight to the importance of enforcing 
proper standards in trying to reconcile that aim with the objective of 
treating the individual fairly” , the Tenganyika approach better 
accomodated ‘‘the realities of human reaction to situations of stress” 
whereas the South African approach “ imposed too demanding a standard 
on ordinary people” and tended “to overlook the realities o f  human 
behaviour. J*°In practice what may happen when a person is grievously 
provoked is that he becomes so angry that he intends to kill or to do serious 
injury to another. That is the position of the classic case of a person who 
kills his spouse caught in the act of adultery. It is not that he or she does 
not realise what he or she is doing, but that his or her selficontrol is so 
overborne that his or her intentional killing is partially excused. To require 
that the loss of self-control must be such that the consequences of the act 
are not intended is to ignore the true effect of provocation.31 Further,
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29‘ These arguments are not entirely convincing. There are many and varied circumstances where 
extenuating circumstances may exist despite the unavailability o f any recognised total or . 
partial defences. It would be untenable to maintain that in all of these situations we might 
just as well allow partial defences as deal with these by way of extenuation. Also it would 
seem that the.policy considerations involved in allowing provocation as a partial defence to an 
intentional killing are of a  different order from those involved in partially excusing an 
intentional killing where there was moderate excess over what was reasonable in cases 
involving self-defence or compulsion. See also the criticisms to be found in (1982) 99 S A  L  J  
at 526 - 528.
30' Sentence reduction exponents argue that as murder can attract sentences ranging from a 
suspended sentence to death, due consideration can be afforded to the provocation involved 
when it comes to deciding upon a suitable penalty. See (1982) 99 S  A  L  J, 524 at 528
31' The line taken by Schreiner J  A in R  v Krull 1959 (3) SA 392 at 398-399 here was that.
“ Whether one says that a provoked man loses the powers of self-control or becomes unable to 
form the intention to kill seems to me to be substantially a question of the choice of words. 
Either form is probably only a roughly approximate description of the actual mental' 
processes. Legal systems can only attempt by one approach or.another to give effect to the 
basic idea, which is that the provoked person may have been so upset that the mental element 
requisite for murder may not have been present” .
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argued Fieldsend C J, if such a test was strictly applied then the defence 
would be admitted in very few cases as “it must be very rare fo r  a person 
to be able to say that he lost control o f  himself to the extent o f  not 
intending the consequences o f his reaction”.12
The adoption of the second rung of Tenganyika was not, however,
• totally unqualified. At p. 807 Fieldsend C J had this to say:- 
“ The provocation must also have been such as to have 
actually caused the accused to have lost his self-control and 
acted in such a manner. The reference to the effect of the 
provocation on the ordinary or On the reasonable man is not : 
a very satisfactory test to have to apply in a plural society, 
There is now particularly in South Africa greater stress being 
laid on the subjective approach to the mental element in 
crime. It may be that the solution is not to apply the test of 
the reasonable man,, but to bring in the necessary objective 
factor in a different: way. This could be done by requiring 
that the provocation was such that it could reasonably be 
regarded as sufficient ground for the loss of self-control that 
led the accused to act against the victim as he did. This, 
together with the requirement that the provocation actually 
caused the accused to lose his self-control, would cover both 
the objective and subjective criteria that any system requires 
if proper regard is to be paid to the sanctity of human life 
and the need to allow Of a conviction for murder, the most 
serious of crimes, in proper cases. They are criteria which 
were approved by the English Criminal Law Revision Com­
mission (1980) Cmnd. 7944, paragraph 81, and they accord 
with the reasoning in the Tenganyika and Bureka Cases”
In order to discuss the import of these views, it may be useful to 
document the background to the recommendations made by English 
Criminal Law Revision Committee in this regard. In England, prior to 
the 1957 Homicide Act, the reasonable man test32 3 which was used to 
determine whether the provocation should reduce murder to manslaughter, 
was interpreted so as to exclude reference to particular personal 
characteristics of the accused. Thus, in the 1954 case of Bedder v DPP 
the fact that the reason why the accused became so incensed was because 
he had been taunted about his sexual impotency. was found not to be 
pertinent when the reasonable man test was being applied, said the House 
of Lords, aS sexual impotency was not a characteristic of a normal,
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32' Emphasis added. A conflicting view was expressed by Beck J (as he then was) in S  v Howard 
1972 R L R 247 at 2540 as follows:-
“ In my view, it would indeed be a rare case in which it would be proper to hold that 
even a,reasonable man would have reacted; not just impulsively and instinctively 
without being capable of forming any intention to kill, nor even recklessly, without 
caring whether death ensued or not, but purposefully with an actual desire to kill’*.
33‘ This test has also been adopted in a large number of other countries, particularly tnose based 
on English law.
reasonable man. The English Criminal Law Revision Committee then 
recommended that ’’the test fo r  provocation should be reformulated so 
that th? accused is judged with due regard to any disability, physical or 
mental, from which he suffered”, (Para 54) arid the approach which they , 
advoted in order to achieve this result was that provocation would be 
sufficient, to reduce the crime to manslaughter ‘‘if, on the facts as they 
appeared to the accused it constitutes a reasonable excuse fo r  his loss o f  
self-control”. This view was slightly revised in their 1980 report, but the 
essence of the 1977 proposal was left unaffected. In the 1980 report the 
reasonable man test was rejected in favour Of a test which simply: directed 
the jury’s attention to the question of whether they, would consider, 
the provocation to have been reasonably sufficient. The exact wording! 
was that provocation should reduce the crime to manslaughter " / / .  . ... 
it can reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for the loss o f self 
control”, taking the facts as they appeared to the accused as well as taking 
into account "any disability, physical or mental, from which he suffered.”
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In English law the resort to the reasonable person test for crime 
reduction in homicide cases was an attempt to reconcile the aim of 
protecting citizens from harmful conduct and that of giving due weight 
to the fact that the accused was provoked. As we have seen, however , 
this test gave rise to problems of interpretation. More fundamental 
objections have also been raised in Britain to the use of this criterion. 
Glanville Williams in 1954 C L R  740 at 741 argued that as the reasonable 
person test is an ethical standard, it is therefore absurd for the law to 
say, in effect, that even that paragon of virtue, the reasonable man, would 
give way to provocation and commit a serious felony. If the reason why 
provoked homicide is punished is to deter people from committing the 
crime, it seems to be anomolous for the law to concede that even despite 
the existence of a heavy penalty for the crime, the reasonable man would 
still commit the crime in exceptional circumstances. Based on these 
arguirients, Glanville Williams contended that it was preferable for the 
acceptance of the defence of provocation simply to be viewed as a 
compromise where the law does not exact full punishment but at the same 
time the propriety of the act is not conceded by the law.
Even more fundamentally, Brett in 1970 C L R  634 forcefully argued 
that once one accepts that genetic and environmental factors produce 
widely varying susceptibilities and responses to provocation, one can no 
longer maintain that there is such a thing as a reasonable person standard 
which can be applied to provocation cases. It is a fiction, he says, to suggest 
that there exists one distinct type of persons comprising virtually the whole 
of the population who respond in a uniform way to differing degrees of 
provocation. Rather there are a multiplicity of different types of persons 
arid it is unfair to punish a person simply because he is nearer to one end 
or the other of the range rather than the centre. He, therefore, advocated 
the total abolition of the reasonable person rule in this context.
It is respectfully submitted that these various objections to the 
reasonable person test are more compelling than some of these raised by
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Fieldsend C J For instance, the reference to the greater stress laid in South 
Africa upon the subjective approach to the mental element in crime does 
not appear to advance the argument vis-a-vis the objective formulation 
at the second stage of Tenganyika. However, it must be accepted that the 
existence of a plural society may serve to compound the complexities in 
applying an objective test because of the increased likely range of responses 
to provocation. Thus, in one cultural context, certain words or conduct 
may be highly provocative, whereas in another, they may be totally 
innocuous.
In the light of the above-mentioned objections to the reasonable 
person formula as applied in the context, one cannot but agree that it would 
be wise to avoid using this test if this is possible. The question is whether 
the adoption of the formulation suggested by the English Criminal Law 
Revision Committee would overcome the difficulties inherent in the 
reasonable person test. On analysis of this substitute test, it would seen 
that it is by no means an easy one to apply. Having found that the accused 
lost his self-control, instead of applying an entirely objective test, the court 
has to take into account certain subjective features in deciding whether 
the provocation could reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for 
the losa of his self-control. The first subjective features which have to be 
taken into account are “the facts as they appeared to the accused. ” 
(Presumably normally if the accused had unreasonably construed the fact 
and jumped to a false conclusion, the provocation could not be considered 
reasonable as a sufficient ground). Secondly, any physical disability has 
to be considered. Little problem is posed by physical disabilities. Thus, 
it seems appropriate to allow the defence it the accused was taunted about 
having only one arm or a badly scarred face. But what about mental 
disabilities? Should the defence be allowed if, for instance, the accused 
is particularly quick-tempered or somewhat psychopathic? Finally, is it 
possible to decide whether the provocation can reasonably be regarded 
as a sufficient ground without some reference to the reasonable person 
criterion as the very use of the word reasonably in the formulation seems 
to imply that the court must assess whether any reasonable person would 
have succumbed to that degree of provocation in those particular 
circumstances? That involves a balancing of the harm caused and the extent 
of provocation.
2. 2 Cases Other than Homicide
It would seem that the only other crimes in respect of which 
provocation can be raised as a partial defence are those of attempted 
murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Attempted 
murder would be amenable to the two stage Tenganyika treatment. Under 
the first rung, if there was no intention to kill because of provocation, 
there is a partial defence and the crime would be reduced to assault with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm.34 Presumably, also, the second rung 
would apply if there was intention but loss of self-control. If objectively
Feltoe, Criminal policy and defence o f  provocation
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;he loss of self-control and subsequent action was reasonably justifiable 
:hen liability would be reduced to assault with intent to do grievous bodily 
larm (or attempted culpable homicide).
With assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, if intent to inflict 
grievous harm is absent because of provocation, then the accused is found 
guilty automatically of the lesser charge- of common assault.3?
With all crimes, other than murder, attempted murder, and assault 
with intent to do grievous bodily harm, provocation docs not constitute 
even a partial defence* but is only taken into account in mitigation of, 
sentence.* 36Even if accused lack.^he mens rea for these other crimes, they 
are still found guilty of these crimes.
’ ■V: PART 2
3. GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW
In this final section I will venture a few observations on the central 
issue in this article, namely , whether our law on the defence of provocation 
as presently constructed and operated strikes a satisfactory and acceptable 
balance between the protection of the public and individual justice to the 
accused. To explore this issue, Twill cite a range of hypothetical examples . 
involving provocation and indicate how our present law would deal with . 
these and I then make some overall comments about the law. .
3.1 Cases where there was a very high degree o f provocation
In each of the cases under this heading it will be taken that the provocation 
was of such a high order that the court was of the opinion that any ordinary 
person faced with that amount of provocation would have acted in the 
self-manner as the accussed.
Case l
The accused, who was grievously provoked, completely lost his self- 
control and, acting without intent to kill, caused the death of the deceased. 
Charge - Murder. Verdict - Culpable homicide.
(Alternatively, the same circumstances, except that the victim did not die 
but sustained serious injuries. /
Charge - Attempted murder Verdict - Assault with intent to do
grievous bodily harm, or
Charge - Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
Verdict - Common assault).
3- ■ See, for instance S v Gomede O-S-l 15-79
36- See, for instance S v Zengeya 1978 (2) SA 319 (R A)
Case 2
The accused-, who was grievously provoked, completely lost his self- 
control and intentionally killed his victim. The court found that the 
reasonable person, subjected to that degree of provocation would have 
acted in the self-same manner as the accused (or that the provocation could 
reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for the loss of self-control). 
Charge - Murder. Verdict - Culpable homicide.
Case 3
The accused who was grievously provoked, completely lost his self- 
control and, either with or without intent, assaulted the provoker. 
Charge - Common assault Verdict - Guilty as charged.
3.2 Cases where there was only very slight provocation
Case 4
The accused, who was provoked only to a very minor extent, was 
a very quick-tempered individual who was very easily angered and he 
completely lost his self-control and, acting without intent to kill, caused 
the death of the deceased.
Charge - Murder Verdict - Culpable homicide.
(Alternatively, the same circumstance, except that the victim did not die 
but sustained serious injuries. -
Charge - Attempted murder. Verdict - Assault with intent to do
grievous bodily harm, or
Charge - Assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
Verdict - Common assault).
Case 5
The accused, who was provoked only to a very minor extent, had 
been drinking heavily and, because his passions were inflamed by the drink, 
he completely lost his self-control and, acting without intent to kill, caused 
the death of the deceased. (Or the accused in his drunken state mistakenly 
believed he had been provoked severely and, having completely lost his 
self-control, unintentionally caused the death of the deceased).
Charge - Murder Verdict - Culpable Homicide.
Case 6
The accused, who was provoked only to a very minor extent was very 
quick-tempered and very easily lost his temper. In response to the 
provocation he completely lost his-control and unintentionally inflicted 
harm on the provoker.
Charge - Common Assault. Verdict - Guilty as charged.
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A comparison between these various cases reveals the following: If 
one compares cases 1 and 2 with cases 4 and 5, the blameworthiness of 
the accused in the first two cases is of a completely different order from 
that in the second two and yet the same verdict returned in hll four 
although, of course, the different levels of blameworthiness will be reflected 
in the magnitude of the sentences imposed. Indeed, in cases 1 and 2 it 
is difficult to say that there is any blameworthiness at all if we concede 
that any person has his breaking point when faced with overwhelming 
provocation. If, in effect, we accept that in cases 1 and 2 any normal person 
might have responded in an identical fashion to the accused; then the 
question might be asked, what rational purpose is served by finding the 
accused guilty of culpable homicide and imposing a penalty-upon them? 
It cannot simply be to register disapproval that death has been caused by 
the accused. If the objective is to teach the accused to exercise more self- 
restraint in the future this seems to be somewhat misplaced as we surely 
do not expect completely superhuman powers of forebearance to be 
exercised by citizens. .
On the other hand, exactly the same verdict is rendered in cases 4 
and 5, despite.the fact that the moral blameworthiness of the accused in 
both these cases is very high. In case 4, although the accused may have 
been born with an irascible personality, the society cannot obviously 
condone the infliction of extreme harm in response to mild provocation 
and therefore, punishment must be imposed in order to inculcate into the 
accused a need for increased efforts towards self-restraint in the future. 
In case 5 the blameworthiness derives from the befuddlement of the 
accused’s perceptions as a result of drink and the consequent excessive 
reaction or the making of the mistake. _
Again, when we compare cases 3 and 6 we.find a clear discrepancy 
in the degrees of moral blameworthiness which is not reflected in the verdict 
which is the same in both cases. The application of the specific intent 
doctrine in provocation cases leads to an absolute rule that if the crime 
is a non-specific intent crime (which common assault is) provocation is 
not a defence. The effect of this rule is that the magnitude of the 
provocation can only be weighed in respect of sentence, Immaterial of 
how serious the provocation, the accused must be found guilty as charged. 
In case 3 this approach may be seefas too harsh and it could be argued 
that the accused should be totally acquitted in this type of case. On the 
other hand, in case 6 the conviction is fully warranted. Although the 
accused lacked intention he was blameworthy in not controlling himself 
from inflicting harm. In this type of, case it is submitted that unless we 
have something to put in its place to safeguard the public interest, we 
should not adopt the recent South African approach of completely 
rejecting the specific intent doctrine.and demanding the presence of the 
subjective intention in all cases involving crimes of intention.. (In that 
country, in the light of the ruling in the Appellate Division of S v 
Chretian 37 that the specific intent doctrine is no longer to be applied in 
cases involving voluntary intoxication, - it seems likely that a similar
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approach will be followed in relation to the defence of provocation.)38 
It is submitted that if we were to throw out the specific intent doctrine, 
thereby making it possible for the accused to escape liability in a case like 
case 6 above balance would be weighted far too heavily in favour of the 
accused at the expense of considerations of public protection.
3.3. Conclusion
The effect of the specific intent doctrine is that the accused never 
escapes liability entirely on the basis of provocation. When charged with 
a specific intent crime a successful plea of provocation leads to a conviction 
for a lesser non-specific intent crime. If charged with a non-specific intent 
crime, provocation does not operate as a defence but only as a mitigatory 
factor.
It has been argued that this doctrine appears to be unduly harsh when 
the provocation was extremely grave. But the total abandonment of the 
doctrine would lead to too lenient treatment of an accused who lacked 
mens rea after having lost his temper when subjected to only very slight 
provocation. One possible solution to this problem is to apply to cases, 
whether the charge be a specific intent one or not, the test as to whether 
the provocation could reasonably be regarded as a sufficient ground for 
the accused’s actions and to acquit the accused if this test is satisfied. It 
has, however, been pointed out that the appliation of the test advocated 
by the English Criminal Law, Revision Commission may not, in practice, 
be an easy one to apply.
Another posible solution would be to adopt the approach favoured 
by some'writers in cases involving voluntary intoxication. In respect of 
voluntary intoxication the writers of South African Criminal Law and 
Procedure, Vol 1, 2nd ed. argue at p. 301 that it is correct to acquit a 
person of any crime, requiring subjective mens rea if, because of 
intoxication, the accused lacked that mens rea. They then, however, add 
that the accused should not escape scot free in these circumstances since 
the accused is blameworthy in getting drunk and then causing the harm 
in question. They therefore argue in favour of the adoption of the German 
law approach which is to have a separate statutory offence
‘ ‘penalizing a person who deliberately or carelessly gets himself 
into a state of acute intoxication and commits an act which 
would have been a crime if he had had criminal capacity” .
We could possibly have some similar provision to cover cases where the 
accused unreasonably loses his self-control in the face of provocation and 
commits a crime without the requisite intention. This would cover cases 
4, 5 and 6 above. The issue of whether it is just and necessary to convict 
the accused of a crime at all in cases 1 ,2  and 3 would still have to be 
considered.
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Finally, I would like to refer briefly to another difficulty which arises 
in provocation cases under our present law. We have seen that the specific 
intent doctrine ensures that accused are always convicted of some crime. 
The problem thus arises of deciding upon a condign level of punishment. 
When imposing punishment in such cases frequently the courts do not 
articulate explicitly the objectives of such punishment. It is respectfully 
submitted that the reasons for the level Of punishment chosen should 
always be carefully thought out and then,Stated. Thus, for instance, if 
the rationale of the punishment is to persuade a quick tempered person 
to exercise greater self-restraint in the future, this should be stated. The 
appropriate level of punishment in such cases still nonetheless remains an 
extremely problematical matter to decide.
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